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Abstract: This paper introduces a new argument against Richard Foleys
threshold view of belief. Foleys view is based on the Lockean Thesis (LT) and the
Rational Threshold Thesis (RTT). The former thesis is the claim that it is
epistemically rational to believe a proposition if and only if it is epistemically
rational to have a degree of confidence in that proposition sufficient for belief.
The latter thesis is the claim that it is epistemically rational to believe a
proposition if and only if it is epistemically rational to have a degree of
confidence in that proposition that meets or exceeds a specified threshold. The
argument introduced here shows that the views derived from the joint
endorsement of the LT and the RTT violate the safety condition on knowledge in
way that threatens the LT and/or the RTT.
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Richard Foley (1992) has famously attempted to integrate views about
the epistemology of full belief and views about probabilistic credences
by means of what he calls the Lockean Thesis:
(LT) For any subject A and proposition p, it is (epistemically)
rational for A to believe p if and only if it is epistemically rational
for A to have a degree of confidence in p sufficient for belief.
The LT is then supplemented by the Rational Threshold Thesis, and
this fleshes out the relevant notion of rational belief employed in the
LT:
(RTT) It is (epistemically) rational for A to believe p if and only
if it is (epistemically) rational for A to have a degree of confi-
dence y in p, where y x.
So, where As degree of confidence in p is equal to or exceeds x, A
has full belief in p. But, we should not set x5 1 (for this is too high),
and we cant let x be set too low (as we would then believe virtually
VC 2018 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
VC 2018 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
METAPHILOSOPHY
Vol. 49, No. 4, July 2018
0026-1068
everything) (Foley 1992, 112). On Foleys view one can then have full
belief in a proposition where the threshold x is met, but where x is less
than probability 1. This requires only that x be set at some value that
is less than 1 but that, in accord with the LT, is sufficiently high. The
combination of the LT and the RTT is supposed to allow for the kind
of integrated view that Foley believes we must have in order to make
sense of our epistemic behavior. This is important because he believes
that the LT allows us to make sense of rational cognitive behavior with-
out the unrealistic and unduly complex assumption that we actually
have fully formed and numerically precise degrees of confidence with
respect to the propositions that we entertain in many epistemic endeav-
ors. In many of those cases we appear to employ what we might call
belief simpliciter. On this view we simply believe, disbelieve, or suspend
judgment about a proposition, rather than having more fine-grained
degrees of belief with respect to that proposition. This simpler concept
of belief is then the more or less all-or-nothing belief of the sort that
can be generated from applying the RTT and the LT to our beliefs.
A number of objections have been raised against the view stemming
from the lottery and preface paradoxes, as well as other sources. Foley
has addressed many of these worries (see Foley 2009). There is, how-
ever, one glaring problem with the RTT. This problem arises when one
attempts to deploy Foleys view. In order to deploy the RTT we must
specify a value for x. Suppose then that one argues that the threshold
for full belief should be x5 0.90. Now, unless the selection of x5 0.90
as the appropriate threshold is grounded in some good reasons R, it
will be arbitrary and hence will not explain why that level of confidence
is epistemically rational and sufficient for full belief, and the same will
go for any selection of a value for x. So, it would appear that any such
selection must ultimately be grounded in some such reasons. Where the
selection of x is grounded in such reasons R, however, it is totally
unreasonable to suppose that those reasons would not also be equally
compelling reasons to set x at x5 0.90 – d or x5 0.901 d where d is
relatively small. Surely this will be the case where d is infinitesimally
small. As a result, the reasoned fixing of x at least appears to be
problematic.
Foley attempts to dodge this particular and deep problem by
unabashedly embracing the idea that there need be no good reasons for
the selection of any particular value for x. Foley explicitly states that
his defense of the LT and the RTT involves the stipulation of x and
says, “Once such a threshold x is stipulated, we can use the Lockean
thesis to say what is required for rational belief: it is rational for you to
believe p just in case it is rational for you to have degree of confidence
y in p, where y x” (Foley 1992, 112). Elsewhere, of the integration of
the LT and the RTT, Foley claims: “This is a tidy result, but it does
invite the follow-up question, what degree of confidence is sufficient
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for belief? But even if it proves difficult to identify a precise threshold
for belief, this in itself wouldnt seem to constitute a serious objection
to the Lockean thesis. It only illustrates what should have been obvious
from the start, namely, the vagueness of belief talk” (Foley 2009, 37).
Of course, Foley is correct here. This worry is not a direct objection
to the LT, but it is a substantive objection to the RTT. Foley then
attempts to disarm this objection: “Still, it seems as if we should be
able to say something, if only very general, about the threshold above
which ones level of confidence in a proposition must rise in order for
someone to believe that proposition. What to say is not immediately
obvious, however, since there does not seem to be any non-arbitrary
way of identifying a threshold. But perhaps we dont need a non-
arbitrary threshold anyway. Why not just stipulate a threshold? We
deal with other kinds of vagueness by stipulation. Why not do the
same here?” (Foley 2009, 38). Foley goes on to say: “Indeed, it might
not even matter much where the threshold is as long as we are consist-
ent in applying it. We wont want to require subjective certainty for
belief. So, the threshold shouldnt be that high. On the other extreme,
we will want to stipulate that for belief one needs to have more confi-
dence in a proposition than its negation. But except for these two
restrictions, we would seem to be pretty much on our own” (Foley
2009, 38).
So, for full belief, ones degree of rational credence must meet or
exceed x, and the same will be true for full beliefs that count as knowl-
edge. Accordingly, this yields the following condition for full belief:
ðFBÞ FBAp  PAðpÞ  x; such that 1 > x > 0:5:
Now, this view will be exceptionally unpalatable to epistemologists who
reject conventionalism, contextualism, and related views. But, it turns
out that this view of belief is subject to additional problematic implica-
tions that are perhaps less easily dealt with than the more standard
objections stemming from the lottery and preface paradoxes, pragmatic
encroachment, and stipulative nature of thresholds in the threshold
view. Specifically, here it will be shown that Foleys suggestion runs
afoul of the safety condition on knowledge no matter what value is
stipulated for x.
This problem arises in virtue of the following basic contention that
Foley appears to be committed to:
ðDÞ KAp ! FBAp:
This is simply the doxastic assumption that knowledge requires full
belief. The idea then is that knowledge is the maximally valedictory
form of rational belief. As Kripke (2011) has shown, however, if one
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accepts factivity and the idea that knowledge entails belief, then one is
thereby committed to the safety condition on knowledge (see Shaffer
2017). We have seen that Foley is implicitly committed to the former
idea, and denying factivity invites all sorts of problematic Morrean
contradictions of the form “I know that p, but :p.” So, it is reasonable
to suppose that Foley is committed to safety, if only by implication.
The safety condition on knowledge is a necessary condition for know-
ing that recently has been systematically defended by Williamson
(2000), Sosa (1999), and Pritchard (2007, 2008, 2009a and 2009b), and
their endorsements of this condition stem from Noziks (1981) work on
knowledge. It is supposed to reflect the basic idea of the sort of reli-
ability associated with bona fide knowledge. The safety condition can
be understood simply as follows:
If A knows that p, then A could not easily have falsely believed that p.
This relatively nontechnical gloss on safety and it can be made more
precise as follows:
ðSafetyÞ ðwiKApÞ ! :½<wi> ðBAp &:pÞ:
Here “<wi>” is the set of world sufficiently close to wi and “BAp” rep-
resents that A believes that p. So understood, the safety condition is
the claim that if A knows that p at wi, then A does not believe that p
when p is false in worlds sufficiently similar to wi. This regimentation
captures the core idea of the safety condition well. Safety has inde-
pendent merit as a condition on knowledge as it reflects a primitive
notion of reliability, but it is an unavoidable consequence of accounts
of knowledge that involve the contentions that knowledge entails both
truth and belief.
Notice then that FB and D entail the following principle about
knowledge that Foley is unavoidably committed to:
ðFKÞ KAp ! PAðpÞ  x; such that 1 > x > 0:5:
The problem then is that it is easy to see that FK entails violations of
safety no matter what value has been stipulated for x. Suppose, for
example, that by stipulation we set the threshold value x at 0.98. We
then get the following specific version of FK:
ðFK0:98Þ KAp ! PAðpÞ  0:98:
Suppose then that we have a case where in world w1 As evidence for
p is such that it meets or exceeds the probability 0.98 threshold. So,
in accordance with FB, A fully believes p. Suppose also that this
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stipulation about x is also sufficient for knowing as FK0.98 implies. The
problem is then that all of this can be true, while A fully believes p
while it is false in worlds close to w1. More formally, given Foleys
theory, it can be the case that wi  KAp &<wi> (FBAp & :p). This
will occur in cases where wi  KAp because A meets or exceeds the
threshold for full belief and meets whatever other conditions there are
for knowing and where <wi> FBAp but where in at least one of
those worlds close to wi :p is true because an improbable condition
obtains. Given our “x5 0.98 model” this might plausibly occur as fol-
lows. Sally plans to draw a ball from an urn containing ninety-nine
white balls and one black ball. On this basis and given Foleys pre-
ferred epistemological views, Sally fully believes that she will draw a
white ball and even knows this. There are, however, close worlds to w1
where Sallys counterpart fully believes she will draw a white ball but
this is false, for drawing a black ball is surely a thing that happens in
some of those worlds that do not differ in almost any way from w1.
They are thus close worlds, but it just happens to be the case that the
improbable outcome occurs in some of those worlds that are virtually
identical in all respects to the indexed world where she knows the draw
will be a white ball and it is. But then we have a violation of safety,
and that spells trouble for any theory of knowledge in which knowing
implies believing and the truth of the known proposition. In turn, this
spells very specific trouble for the LT and the RTT. What we have is a
plethora of cases that can easily be generated for any x that show that
FK and safety are incompatible. But safety follows from the doxastic
and factive conditions on knowledge, and it is hard to see how one
might cede either of those orthodoxies. So, this casts deeply serious
doubts on either or both the LT and the RTT, whatever independent
plausibility they might enjoy as an analysis of everyday belief.
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